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How to Spend It: 
Resource Wealth and the Distribution of Resource Rents 
PAUL SEGAL*
Abstract 
Natural resource revenues differ from other government revenues both in their time 
profile, and in their political and legal status: they are volatile and exhaustible, and 
belong to all citizens of the country in which they are located. This paper discusses 
the optimal expenditure of natural resource revenues, based on economic theory 
and with reference to existing international practices. It considers both the 
distributional impact and the efficiency of alternative policies, focusing on the 
extent to which they succeed in providing all citizens with their share of the 
benefits due to natural resources. It also shows how, by dropping the assumption of 
a representative agent, a concern for poverty and social welfare more generally 
interacts with and alters standard recommendations for the intertemporal 
management of resource revenues. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Resource rents are the closest we have to manna from heaven. They represent unearned 
value, providing a government with a potential source of revenue that should be easy to 
collect, enabling greater expenditures on behalf of citizens for a given tax burden. But 
natural resources are hard to manage. From the establishment of a productive resource 
sector, through the income flows to government and, finally, fiscal expenditures, resource 
revenues in practice are rarely uncontroversial. 
 This paper picks up the challenge from the point at which revenues from 
hydrocarbons and minerals start to flow to the government.1 I ask how these revenues are 
spent in practice, and suggest how they might better be used to benefit the citizens who 
ultimately own them. 
 Resource revenues almost invariably flow through government budgets on their 
way to citizens. Their management is therefore a part of fiscal policy more broadly. But 
there are two features of resource revenues that set them apart from general revenues. 
First, their time profile is distinctive: revenues are volatile, driven largely by the volatility 
 
* The author would like to thank two anonymous referees for comments on the paper. 
1 Other natural resources, such as fisheries and agriculture, differ in their ownership structure and 
productive structure, and are not discussed here. 
2of commodity prices, and they are, generally speaking, temporary (though in some cases 
their lifespan is very long). These features imply that resource revenues may have to be 
smoothed over time, and that it may be optimal to save some share of them for future 
consumption. I discuss how these decisions should be made in the light of broader 
macroeconomic conditions and policy. 
 The second feature of government resource revenues is that they have not been 
taxed from any citizen, and all citizens have an equal claim on them. That is, unlike taxes 
that are raised on individuals and businesses in the economy, resource revenues have not 
been appropriated from anyone. In this sense resource revenues are distributed, but not 
redistributed. Moreover, citizens of resource-rich countries typically know this and have 
a strong sense of entitlement to their resources, a sentiment sometimes known as resource 
nationalism. As I discuss below, in many countries this has the unfortunate effect of 
lending support to inefficient and regressive fuel subsidies. But the underlying sentiment 
is justified. 
 Based on a consideration of the ownership of resource revenues, this paper 
focuses on the distributional impact of their expenditures. Unlike much of the literature, I 
drop the convenient fiction of a representative consumer in order to focus on how 
different forms of expenditure affect social welfare. The fiction is quite acceptable when 
the question is revenue stabilization or saving for the future, and I also adopt it in that 
context. But a concern with poverty reduction or inequality requires the recognition that 
different individuals benefit from resource revenues to different degrees, so the 
distribution of these benefits within a country also matters. 
 Given this focus, much of this paper is concerned with fiscal policies used by 
governments of resource-rich countries to get resource rents into the hands of their 
citizens, including public employment, public services, cash benefits and subsidies. I also 
consider the general equilibrium effects of resource revenues that are predicted by 
economic theory because these imply that household incomes will be indirectly affected 
by resources through structural changes in the economy, in addition to any direct effects 
due to fiscal policy. 
 The largest literature on the resource sector concerns the ‘resource curse’, the 
proposition that a large resource sector has adverse effects on a country’s economy, 
3politics and institutions. Reviews of this topic exist (e.g. van der Ploeg 2010) and I refer 
to these issues only to the extent that they are directly relevant to the question at hand. 
 One strand of this literature that is pertinent to the present topic concerns the 
frequency with which resource revenues are wasted, misused or lost to corruption. 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) and Boschini, Pettersson and Roine (2007) argue that 
natural resources are good for growth in the context of ‘producer-friendly’ institutions 
and bad for growth in the context of ‘grabber-friendly’, i.e. rent-seeker-friendly, 
institutions. Karl (1997) argued that a large resource sector is itself likely to produce poor 
institutions, while Ross (2004) examines the argument that low levels of taxation, as are 
common in resource-rich countries, may help to sustain non-democratic and rent-seeking 
governments because untaxed citizens are less likely to demand government 
accountability. Under such circumstances Robinson and Torvik (2005) show how ‘white 
elephants’, or large government expenditures on capital formation or infrastructure that 
have negative social returns, may be used by politicians as tools of clientelism. 
 These are important reasons why resource revenues may not be spent optimally. 
In modest cases of corruption or misuse of revenues, solutions such as increased 
transparency may help. Solving the larger question of systematic misuse, however, 
involves fixing political systems and institutions, and the question of how to democratize 
a nation is beyond the scope of this paper. Our starting point is the assumption that policy 
makers are primarily interested in producing the best possible outcomes for their country. 
I refer to how institutional arrangements may improve or worsen outcomes, but not how 
to acquire such policy makers in the first place. 
 In discussions of resource rents there often emerge powerful intuitions that are not 
grounded in any rational judgement. One is that there is something undesirable about 
importing goods as opposed to producing them in one’s own country. For instance, one 
hears Mexicans objecting to the fact that they have to import refined oil products despite 
their substantial exports of crude oil. To an economist this is no more than a prejudice: if 
it is cheaper to import goods than to produce them at home, then the imports are 
preferable. The exception to this is when there is some positive externality associated 
with producing a good, a point I will discuss later. 
4Another strong intuition often expressed in discussions of resource rents is that 
there is something immoral about living off rents without having to work. As I discuss 
later, Kuwaiti nationals, for example, could easily afford to live off their oil rents without 
working; some interpret their system of public employment as enabling just this. There 
may be good reasons for recipients of rent to work even if they do not have to, but I take 
the view that it is unrealistic and, indeed, patronizing to advise them not to spend their 
wealth on leisure if they choose to do so. As I discuss below, however, the Kuwaiti 
system as it stands is certainly inefficient. 
 The next section sets the stage by clarifying the concept of resource rents and 
discussing resource ownership. Section 3 turns to the core question of this paper: how do 
countries spend their resource revenues, and how should they spend them? I discuss 
intertemporal issues relatively briefly because they are already the subject of much of the 
existing literature. I discuss the within-period distribution in greater detail. Section 4 
analyses the economic mechanisms through which natural resources affect household 
incomes, (almost) independently of the specifics of how revenues are spent. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. RENTS AND RESOURCE OWNERSHIP 
The twentieth century saw a dramatic reorientation of resource ownership rights. First, 
the principle that governments as opposed to private landowners owned subsoil resources 
was settled in almost all countries (private land in the USA being the only major 
exception), with private agents gaining access to them through regulated contracts of 
various kinds (Mommer 2002). More dramatically, decolonization led to an assertion of 
the rights of developing country governments and a massive swing in bargaining power 
in their favour, away from the international mining companies and their rich-country 
owners that had dominated the industry. The development of national oil and mining 
companies was part of this trend. 
 This shift in power from mining companies to producer governments is the 
original sense of resource nationalism: the understanding that resources belong to the 
country in which they are located, and should be used to benefit that country. This 
principle has now been codified in numerous international human rights treaties (Wenar 
2007: 14). Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
5International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights state in their Article 1 
that ‘All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources.’ One hundred and fifty-one countries have adopted at least one of these 
treaties. 
 In practice, resource nationalism meant a rising share of total resource revenues 
going to national governments as opposed to international mining companies. So how 
much should a government expect to receive from its resources? 
 For clarification it should be noted that the term resource revenues is ambiguous. 
The broader sense refers to the total revenues due to natural resources – essentially the 
volume of the resource extracted times the international price – which have to cover costs 
of extraction, profits to private parties that are involved, and income flowing to the 
government. In almost all countries private mining companies are involved in extracting 
and processing the resource, and they require payment out of these revenues. 
 The narrower sense of resource revenues refers only to the revenues that flow to 
the government, after private companies and any other costs have been paid, and which 
are available for government spending. When there is any ambiguity I will refer to the 
former as total revenues and the latter as government revenues. 
 Theoretically, total resource revenues can be broken down into costs of extraction 
(including exploration and any other ex-ante costs) and resource rents. Rents are defined 
as the payment to a factor of production over and above the sum necessary to induce it to 
do its work (Wessel 1967: 1222). For natural resources, this implies that any payments to 
the resource owner that remain after competitive costs of extraction have been paid count 
as rents. This is because resources have no value while left in the ground, i.e. there is no 
opportunity cost to extraction, so the resource owner will be willing to have the resource 
extracted (‘do its work’) if doing so will provide them with any net income.2
Since the government is the owner of the natural resource, government revenues 
should in theory be precisely equal to the resource rents: payments to the companies 
involved count as costs of extraction, and the government should receive the remainder. 
 
2 If there are negative externalities to resource extraction, such as environmental costs or social costs to 
people who live near the extraction site, then analytically they are irrelevant to the breakdown between 
costs and rents precisely because they are external. Economic efficiency, however, demands that these costs 
be internalized, so extraction will be efficient only if the rents at least cover the value of any externalities. 
6In practice, however, it is very difficult to identify what counts as resource rents 
because it is very difficult to specify precisely how much the relevant costs should be. 
Costs of extraction arise from the employment of land, labour and capital, embodying 
human capital and technology. These are typically provided by the mining company that 
is contracted by the government (or, in the case of national mining companies, may be 
owned by the government). They must also include the costs of exploration, which build 
in the risk of finding no resources. But all these costs vary over time. Moreover, mining 
companies require at least a normal return to their capital over time, but will put up with 
large swings over the cycles of rising and falling prices. That is, what may appear an 
excessively high return on capital in one period may be making up for very low returns in 
the past or future, and vice versa. 
 For these reasons there is no a priori way to determine how much of total resource 
revenues count as rents. The only practical way to ensure that governments receive the 
rents they are due is to ensure that the processes by which contracts are awarded are 
competitive and transparent. When they are, competition between companies will bid 
down what they charge and bid up the amount received by the government. If the process 
is fair, then one may even say that whatever the government gets after such a bidding 
process counts, by definition, as the rents, because the process has revealed what the 
correct (competitive) costs are.3
3. HOW TO SPEND IT: THE INTER- AND INTRA-TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCE 
REVENUES 
The share of total natural resource revenues that flows to the government is a component 
of fiscal revenues more generally, and should be considered in the light of overall fiscal 
policy. Indeed, in most countries the government simply absorbs resource revenues into 
the general budget, making no extra effort to manage them. But the intertemporal 
distribution of resource revenues demands particular attention for two reasons: first, 
revenues tend to be highly volatile, reflecting the volatility of commodity prices. Second, 
they are in principle exhaustible and in many cases will be expected to run out in the 
foreseeable future. Volatility calls for short-run expenditure smoothing; exhaustibility 
 
3 Radon (2007) discusses the challenges faced by resource-rich countries in negotiating with oil companies, 
while Johnston (2007) describes how to analyse the terms of a contract. 
7may call for long-run saving (which is formally just longer-term smoothing). Both, 
however, need to be considered in the context of wider intertemporal macroeconomic 
policy, as I discuss below. 
 The composition of expenditure of resource revenues within a given year, or 
intratemporally, must also be considered in the context of fiscal expenditures more 
generally. But again they deserve special attention, in this case for the political-legal 
reason that citizens typically view them differently from other sources of tax revenue. We 
saw above that it is in the nature of rents that they should not belong to any individual or 
group of individuals in particular, but instead belong to all citizens, since those factors 
required to extract and process the resource are already being paid before the rents, or 
government revenues, are calculated. For this reason, citizens often have strong feelings 
about the appropriate use of their resources and the revenues they provide. Later I will 
show that some of these feelings – in particular, the widespread view that living in an oil-
rich country implies that one should be entitled to cheap fuel – are misguided. But we 
will also see that there are better ways of satisfying the quite justifiable view that 
resources belong to all. 
In economics the analysis of intertemporal issues invariably assumes a 
representative agent, and most discussions of natural resource revenues do not go beyond 
this assumption. But any analysis of social welfare, including any analysis of poverty 
reduction, has to discard it and recognize that different people have different starting 
positions, and receive different benefits from the various forms of expenditure. Indeed, 
the same assumption that motivates the intertemporal analysis – that income provides 
diminishing marginal returns to utility – also, under standard social welfare functions, 
implies an aversion to inequality. The optimization problem is essentially the same: 
diminishing marginal utility implies that it is optimal to smooth expenditures over time, 
and also to smooth incomes across individuals, i.e. reduce inequality. 
 Atkinson’s (1970) classic analysis of the link between the distribution of income 
and social welfare, however, shows that it is not necessary to go via utility because one 
can jump straight to a social welfare function with diminishing marginal returns in each 
individual’s income. The social welfare function that Atkinson derives is precisely 
8isomorphic to the standard modern analysis of intertemporal optimization (e.g. Obstfeld 
and Rogoff 1996). 
 Both analyses use the (symmetric) constant elasticity of substitution function,4
where the only parameter to choose is the elasticity of substitution itself, or equivalently 
the elasticity of marginal utility. The Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change 
(Stern et al. 2006) assumes a value of one, which implies that a 1 per cent change in 
income is valued equally at any level of income (see Beckerman and Hepburn 2007 for 
discussion). Thus if society is twice as rich in thirty years’ time then we value an income 
rise of $2 then as much as we value $1 today. Using the same value for an Atkinson 
social welfare function would imply that as a society we value $1 to person X as highly as 
$2 to someone who has twice X’s income. Thus extra income is more important in poorer 
periods, and for poorer people. 
 Not everyone will agree with an Atkinson social welfare function. But most 
people agree that eliminating extreme poverty is an urgent goal in itself, and that $1 that 
raises someone out of extreme poverty is more important than $1 given to someone not in 
poverty. This assumption lies behind the World Bank’s motto that ‘Our dream is a world 
free of poverty’, for instance. It implies a social welfare function that has diminishing 
marginal returns to individual incomes at least around the poverty line. This on its own 
justifies a concern with the distribution of income, and hence with the distributional 
incidence of resource expenditures. 
3.1. Intertemporal issues: revenue saving and smoothing 
The volatility of resource revenues implies that special efforts may be required to smooth 
them. Their exhaustibility implies that it may be optimal to save some portion of them for 
the future. Both need to be considered in the wider context of macroeconomic 
management, specifically macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth. 
 The volatility of resource revenues is driven primarily by the volatility of 
commodity prices, and is famously difficult to manage. The temptation is to spend all the 
revenues that are available at any given time. The standard intertemporal economic 
model of consumption, based on the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to 
 
4 And for the same reason, namely that it is the only symmetric, additively separable and homothetic 
function. 
9income, implies that it is optimal to consume the same amount in each period, requiring 
saving in periods of high revenues and dissaving in periods of low revenues. This does 
not take into account macroeconomic cycles, however, and standard macroeconomic 
analysis requires that fiscal policy should still be counter-cyclical where possible. Thus 
the point is not exactly to smooth expenditures, but rather to vary total expenditures 
according to macroeconomic needs, and not according to the level of current resource 
revenues. 
 There are also important practical reasons for avoiding expenditure volatility. 
These are due to frictions both in government expenditures and in the economy, which 
imply that volatile expenditures can have real costs. Economic frictions imply that a rise 
in expenditures may lead to bottlenecks as productive resources (labour and capital) 
cannot move quickly enough to fulfil all new demands, causing inflation in sectors with 
shortages; a decline in expenditure will lead to unemployment and idle capacity. 
 Frictions in government expenditures, both bureaucratic and due to political 
pressures, imply that when revenues fall it is difficult to make expenditure cuts, or to 
impose cuts in private consumption. This is likely to lead to fiscal and/or current account 
deficits and, over time, to unsustainable debts. This was the experience of Zambia from 
the mid-1970s and through the 1980s, when national expenditures did not adjust to 
declining copper revenues, leading to crises in the late 1980s (Adam and Simpasa 2009). 
All of these problems can be avoided by effective smoothing of revenues. 
 The difficulty with smoothing is that it requires an estimate of the long-run value 
of revenues, which in turn requires estimating the long-run commodity price (as well as 
extraction costs). This is impossible to do with certainty. Chile takes two difference 
approaches for two different minerals, the revenues of which are managed in its Fund for 
Social and Economic Stabilization. Its major export, copper, has comprised 14–21 per 
cent of GDP as value added since 2005, while government revenues due to the resource 
are 1.7–5.7 per cent of GDP, or 9–22 per cent of total government revenue. Chile 
employs a panel of experts to estimate the long-run price of copper in order to smooth the 
expenditure of these revenues. For revenues from molybdenum, a much smaller export, 
Chile takes the moving average of the monthly prices for the past four years (Fuentes 
2009). 
10 
 
While smoothing resource expenditures is both technically and politically 
difficult, there is virtually uniform agreement that, for the reasons above, it is highly 
advisable. The question of saving revenues for the future, however, is more debatable. 
 The intertemporal economic model above is also known as the permanent income 
(PI) approach, and this highlights the second standard recommendation for revenue 
management: that revenues due to an exhaustible resource should be saved, with only 
their permanent or annuity value spent each year. A still more conservative approach than 
this is the bird-in-hand (BIH) rule, which states that all revenues should go into a fund, 
and that current consumption should come only from the real return to that fund. Under 
BIH it is therefore the real return to already-extracted resources, as opposed to the 
expected real return on the value of the entire resource stock, that is spent. Therefore 
once the resource is exhausted BIH collapses to the PI rule, but expenditures start off 
lower than under PI and on a rising path, levelling out only once the resource is 
exhausted. 
 The BIH rule underlies Norway’s fiscal rule for oil revenues, under which all of 
the net cash flow from the extraction of petroleum is saved in the Government Pension 
Fund: Global in order to finance pensions in the future. Since 2005 oil and gas 
production have comprised 19–25 per cent of GDP as value added, of which government 
revenues from the sector comprised 4–6 per cent of GDP, and 7–10 per cent of total fiscal 
revenues. The fiscal rule states that for current expenditures, only ‘the expected return on 
the fund can be used. The expected real rate of return on the fund is estimated at 4 per 
cent. This means that the fiscal budget can be settled with a deficit corresponding to this 
rate of return.’5 In practice, however, this rule has been breached in most years (Jafarov 
and Leigh 2007). 
 Intuitively it seems prudent to save the capital due to resource revenues for the 
future, while spending only the sustainable permanent return on that capital in each 
period. Barnett and Ossowski (2003: 47) put this viewpoint when they state that ‘The 
long-run challenge for fiscal policy … reflecting a concern for intergenerational equity, 
should be met by targeting a fiscal policy that preserves government wealth – 
 
5 Statistics Norway, ‘Focus on Public Finances: Petroleum Revenue’, 
http://www.ssb.no/off_finans_en/read_more.html, accessed 20 October 2011. 
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appropriately defined, inter alia, to include oil.’ The argument that an exhaustible 
resource should not be consumed but should be transformed into an income-yielding 
asset is appealing. 
 This argument is not in fact optimal, however, even under the assumptions of the 
PI hypothesis: the judgement of how much to save has to be made in the light of 
expectations of future levels of income and the stock of capital more generally. In 
particular, the higher the expected rate of per capita economic growth, the less it makes 
sense to defer consumption for the future. If it is optimal to smooth consumption over 
time, including across generations, then the fact that people will be richer in the future 
implies that people today should be consuming more of the finite resource revenues than 
people in the future. Moreover, while at first blush it may seem unfair for current 
generations to consume the value of finite natural assets, they will in any case leave most 
of their physical assets to future generations, in the form of the capital stock. 
 When we drop the assumption of a representative agent then this argument 
becomes even stronger for countries with significant levels of poverty. If our social 
welfare function is sensitive to extreme poverty, and we expect that growth will lift 
people above this poverty line in the future, then spending resource revenues on poverty 
reduction in the short term is likely to be optimal. 
 Some of these points can be made using standard economic analysis, as used, for 
instance, in the Stern Review (Stern et al. 2006). On this approach the future is 
discounted geometrically at a rate of 
   
where  is the subjective discount rate,  the elasticity of marginal utility and  the rate 
of per capita consumption growth. Higher g means that consumption will be higher in the 
future in any case, implying that there is less reason to defer consumption today. Stern 
argues for   	
6 and, as we saw above, for   	, implying that a 1 per cent 
increase in income is valued at the same amount regardless of the level of income; other 
values have been argued for (see Beckerman and Hepburn 2007 for discussion). Higher 
 
6 Stern argues that, even if individuals discount their own future consumption, society should not discount 
the consumption of future individuals. On the other hand, he argues, there is some small risk of the 
extinction of the human species, implying a non-zero .
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values for  imply a higher aversion to inequality and correspondingly a stronger 
preference for smoothing income. 
 Though future consumption is discounted, deferring consumption and investing 
revenues gives a return; let i be the rate of return. This means that saving can provide 
more consumption in the future than we are giving up today. Then it is optimal to save 
any extra income, as opposed to consuming it today, if and only if 
     
Thus saving for the future is more likely to be optimal the higher the expected return on 
investment, the lower the growth rate, and the less one cares about inequality and 
smoothing income. For a developing country with respectable growth rates and high 
levels of poverty, the discount rate will be high. This suggests that spending resource 
revenues today to alleviate poverty may be optimal. On the other hand, if invested well 
then the social return to investment may also be high, as I discuss below. 
 In arriving at an optimum there are two further issues to consider. First, one might 
expect investment to have diminishing marginal returns, so that i is declining as the level 
of investment rises. Second, macroeconomically significant levels of investment will lead 
to a rising g. Hence if      before any investment is made then revenues should be 
invested up to the point where i has declined and g has risen enough to equalize the two 
sides. Further revenues should then be consumed. If      to start with, then all 
revenues should be consumed. In general, there is no reason to assume that the optimal 
amount to consume will coincide with the PI due to the stock of the resource, so there is 
no reason to believe that the PI approach is optimal. 
 Supposing that some share of resource revenues is to be invested, what is the best 
way to do this? That is, what investment will give the best long-run return? Standard 
economic advice, typically given by the IMF, favours the use of sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs). These are funds, like Norway’s or Chile’s, that invest abroad in a variety of 
financial instruments. The advantage of investing abroad is that the returns to an SWF are 
supposed to be uncorrelated with most shocks that hit the country.7 So while a decline in 
copper prices will reduce Chile’s copper revenues, it should not adversely affect the real 
 
7 ‘Supposed to be’ because in the financial crisis of 2008–9 almost all asset classes, including stock markets 
and commodities, declined at the same time. 
13 
 
return accruing to its fund. However, it has recently been argued (e.g. by Collier, van der 
Ploeg and Spence 2009; van der Ploeg and Venables 2010) that many developing 
countries can achieve higher social returns by investing domestically in infrastructure, 
public goods, education and other public services than by investing abroad.8 This is 
particularly likely because the positive spillovers of such investments can imply that their 
total return to the country is higher than just the direct financial return. Moreover, many 
countries under-invest in these areas because of credit constraints, and resource revenues 
loosen this constraint. 
 On the other hand, domestic investment may be inefficient in practice. Robinson 
and Torvik (2005) discuss a range of examples of ‘white elephant’ projects that, they 
argue, should be understood as clientelistic payments by politicians to their supporters. 
Also, as mentioned above, bottlenecks may imply limited absorptive capacity, where too 
much investment may lead to inflation rather than increased output. Clearly, domestic 
investment should always be subject to thorough cost–benefit analysis to minimize these 
risks. But the point remains that there is no reason to assume that investment in 
international financial instruments will be optimal. 
3.2. The distribution of resource revenues 
How are resource revenues spent, and who benefits from them? As already discussed, the 
expenditure of resource revenues should be considered in the context of fiscal 
expenditures more generally. But what makes them different is that, unlike fiscal 
revenues funded by taxation of individuals and businesses, they have not been 
appropriated from anyone. Unlike standard fiscal revenues, therefore, there is a sense in 
which resource revenues are distributed, but not redistributed. However, I will use the 
term redistribution in the following way. I start from the assumption that every citizen 
has an equal claim to government resource revenues. Then if a policy implies that one 
subset of citizens benefits from the fiscal system by less than their population share of 
revenues, and another by more, this will be considered a redistribution away from the 
former and to the latter. 
 
8 This research is part of the background to the Natural Resource Charter, an organization set up to 
establish norms and guidelines for resource-rich countries. 
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This can be significant, as Segal (2010) finds in the case of Mexico. Since 2005, 
hydrocarbon revenues received by the government have comprised 7.9–10.5 per cent of 
GDP and 31–41 per cent of government revenue. Mexico’s fiscal system is progressive at 
first glance: poorer households receive more in benefits (including benefits in kind such 
as health and education services) than they pay in taxes, and vice versa for richer 
households. But when one takes account of the fact that every Mexican starts off entitled 
to her or his per capita share of government oil revenues, it is clearly regressive: in 2008, 
households in the bottom 90 per cent of the income distribution received net benefits 
worth less than their share of oil revenues, while those in the top 10 per cent received 
more. That is, the net effect of Mexico’s fiscal system was to transfer oil entitlements 
from the bottom 90 per cent to the richest 10 per cent. 
 In analysing the distributional impact of fiscal policy it is necessary to define 
different senses in which a policy can be progressive and regressive. A policy is 
relatively progressive if it reduces the relative or proportional difference in incomes 
between the poor and the rich. Thus a benefit that raises the incomes of the poor by 10 
per cent and raises the incomes of the rich by 5 per cent is relatively progressive because 
it reduces the ratio of incomes of the rich to the poor. Similarly, a tax of 10 per cent on 
the rich and 5 per cent on the poor is relatively progressive. A policy that is strictly 
relatively progressive will necessarily lower inequality according to all standard (Lorenz-
consistent) inequality measures, while a policy that is relatively regressive will raise 
inequality by these measures. 
 A policy is absolutely progressive if it reduces the absolute difference in income 
between rich and poor. Thus a benefit that gives $10 to each poor person and $5 to each 
rich person is absolutely progressive, as is a tax that takes $10 from the rich and $5 from 
the poor. If it increases the absolute difference then it is absolutely regressive. 
 A common way to pass resource rents on to citizens is to use them to substitute 
for existing taxes. Bornhorst, Gupta and Thornton (2008) find that on average countries 
tend to reduce the collection of non-resource revenues (both taxes and other sources of 
income) by 0.2 percentage points of GDP for every 1 percentage point of GDP they 
receive in resource revenues. The benefits of lower taxes accrue to individuals according 
to how their own tax burden declines. Eliminating taxation altogether, for instance, is not 
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a distribution-neutral policy if the taxes being eliminated are not distribution-neutral. 
Where taxes are or would be relatively progressive, a proportionally uniform tax 
reduction is regressive, and vice versa. 
 In the remainder of this section I discuss the expenditure side of fiscal policy. I 
first consider two common routes through which governments channel resource rents to 
citizens: fuel subsidies and public employment. I then discuss policies that involve more 
direct means of distributing resource revenues. 
3.2.1. Fuel subsidies 
Fuel subsidies are a common and very popular policy in hydrocarbon-rich countries, 
where the population typically feels a sense of entitlement to hydrocarbons. Baig et al. 
(2007) find that net oil exporters tend to pass through much less of fuel price rises to 
consumers than do net fuel importers. For gasoline, kerosene and diesel Baig et al. find 
that net oil exporters passed through only 0.46, 0.43 and 0.7 times the rise in international 
prices over 2003–6. These compare with 1.09, 0.91 and 1.15, respectively, for net oil 
importers. 
 The popularity of fuel subsidies is not deserved, however: they are both highly 
inefficient and in most cases also regressive. Their inefficiency is easy to see if one 
considers the simple experiment of exchanging $1 of fuel subsidy for a cash transfer of 
$1. With the cash one can choose to spend the $1 on fuel, in which case one is in the 
same position as with the subsidy. But one can also choose to spend some share of the $1 
on something else. The fuel subsidy implies forced expenditure on fuel as opposed to on 
other goods and services that might be preferred. 
 The costs of subsidies can be very high. In Mexico in 2008 they rose to 1.8 per 
cent of GDP (Segal 2010). For 2005 Coady et al. (2006) estimated them at 12.7 per cent 
in Azerbaijan, 3.1 per cent in Bolivia, 3.6 per cent in Ecuador, 4.1 per cent in Egypt, 3.2 
per cent in Indonesia, 5.8 per cent in Jordan and 9.2 per cent in Yemen.9
In addition to being inefficient, fuel subsidies also tend to be regressive because 
richer people tend to spend a higher share of their incomes on fuel, largely because richer 
 
9 Note that these figures are costs to the government, but do not represent the value of lost GDP due to the 
inefficiency of subsidies. The net loss in value is smaller because, while $1 spent on fuel subsidies is worth 
less to a household than $1 in cash, it is nonetheless worth significantly more than nothing. 
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people are more likely to own cars (Coady et al. 2006). In Mexico in 2006, for instance, 
over 70 per cent of the benefits of fuel subsidies went to the top 30 per cent of the 
population. This made the subsidies clearly regressive in absolute terms. Moreover, the 
subsidies were regressive even in the relative sense because the top 30 per cent received 
about 60 per cent of total income, net of fiscal policy – so their share of the fuel subsidy 
was even higher than their share of income (Segal 2010). 
 The distributional impact depends to some extent on which fuels are subsidized. 
Kerosene, for instance, tends to be used more by the poor than by the rich, whereas the 
opposite is true for gasoline. Coady et al. (2006) estimate the share of total fuel subsidies 
received by the bottom 40 per cent (Table 1). The fact that the share received is always 
below 40 per cent implies that the subsidies are absolutely regressive. Moreover, in 
Bolivia, Mali and Sri Lanka richer quintiles spend a higher share of their income on fuel, 
suggesting that subsidies are also relatively regressive in these countries (Coady et al 
2006: 16). 
The popularity of fuel subsidies is presumably based on the assumption that their 
elimination will not be compensated through other fiscal means. Indonesia in 1998 and 
Venezuela in 1989 faced riots when the government attempted to raise the price of 
gasoline, although other countries have had more success in explaining the benefits of 
reform to their populations (Bacon and Kojima 2006). Below I discuss Iran’s ongoing 
efforts in this area. 
 Are subsidies always a bad way to spend money? There are two potential 
arguments in their favour, but neither applies to fuel. The first applies to goods or 
Table 1. Share of fuel subsidies received by the bottom 40 per cent 
Country Share of fuel 
subsidies received 
by bottom 40 per 
cent (%) 
Bolivia 15.3 
Ghana 23.0 
Jordan 21.2 
Mali 23.9 
Sri Lanka 25.1 
Source: Coady et al. (2006: 13). 
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services with a positive externality, such as investment in technology. Since fuel 
consumption has strong negative externalities due to environmental pollution, this 
argument certainly cannot be used to justify fuel subsidies. On the contrary, the negative 
externalities justify taxation rather than subsidy, and this partly explains why so many 
fuel importers impose taxes on fuel. 
 The second potential argument is that a subsidy can be a second-best 
redistribution: if we want to get income to a subset of the population, but targeting them 
directly with cash transfers is costly, then subsidizing some good that they use a lot of 
can be a form of indirect redistribution. This may apply to subsidizing basic foodstuffs as 
a poverty reduction strategy. If the rich consume a larger absolute quantity of the 
subsidized good then the subsidy will remain regressive in the absolute sense, but it will 
be progressive in the relative sense as long as they spend a lower share of their income 
on it than do the poor. Again, however, this does not apply to fuel: we have seen that fuel 
subsidies tend to be regressive in both absolute and relative terms. 
3.2.2. Public employment 
A second common way to spend resource revenues is through employment creation, 
including public employment. Karl (1997: 27) argues that ‘programs of employment 
creation’ were a significant part of the reaction of Latin American oil exporters to the rise 
in oil prices in the 1970s, and that ‘in each country, middle classes made up of state 
employees, small shopkeepers, and skilled laborers grew rapidly, fostered by oil-fuelled 
economic dynamism’. El Katiri, Fattouh and Segal (in press) argue that Kuwait uses 
public employment and public pensions as the primary means of distributing resource 
rents to the population. A job in the public sector is guaranteed to Kuwaiti nationals and 
comes with attractive salaries and benefit packages, explaining the fact that 91 per cent of 
the Kuwaiti national labour force works in the public sector, while 98 per cent of private 
sector jobs are occupied by non-Kuwaitis. 
 There is a widespread perception that jobs so created tend to be unproductive. In 
private discussions observers of Kuwait, including Kuwaiti nationals, often claim (and 
complain) that many Kuwaiti public employees do essentially nothing in return for their 
wage. Morality aside, the problem with distributing rents through unproductive public 
employment is that it has a high opportunity cost: people who could be doing productive 
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work elsewhere are attracted into unproductive public sector jobs because of the benefits 
they receive, funded by resource rents. Individual Kuwaitis do not in fact have the option 
of working productively while also receiving their full share of resource rents, because in 
order to receive the rents they have to spend office hours doing an unproductive job. 
Kuwaitis face the following choice: be unproductive in the public sector and be rewarded 
with oil rents, or be productive in the private sector and not be rewarded with oil rents. It 
would be more efficient to give Kuwaiti nationals their wage, or their share of rents, 
unconditionally and allow them to take up another, productive, job in the private sector – 
which is one way of seeing direct revenue distribution, a policy I discuss below. 
 Another example is Mexico’s refineries, owned and run by the national oil 
company Pemex. These refineries are among the least efficient in the world, partly 
because they employ six times as many people as US refineries of comparable size and 
complexity, without higher levels of production.10 It appears that most of these 
employees are not being productive, but political pressures and the strength of the Pemex 
union preclude any reduction in the workforce. 
3.2.3. Direct distribution 
The conceptually simplest way to distribute resource revenues to the population is as an 
equal, universal and unconditional cash transfers. Such a policy, also known as a 
resource dividend, has several advantages (Segal 2011).11 First, since all citizens receive 
their per capita share of government resource revenues we can be sure that the 
distribution of the benefits of these revenues is fair: since the resource belongs to all 
citizens, it is appropriate that all should receive an equal share. 
 While this implies that the resource dividend is not explicitly a poverty reduction 
scheme, Segal finds that it would have a large impact on poverty: if all developing 
countries adopted it globally, then global poverty at the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
US$1-a-day line would be better than halved. Even in some countries that are not 
particularly resource rich but have a lot of poverty – such as India, where resource rents 
comprise around 5 per cent of GDP – poverty would be approximately halved. Such a 
 
10 These data are from proprietary surveys produced by Salomon and are not publicly available. 
11 Moss (2011) discusses the idea in the context of existing cash transfer schemes in developing countries, 
and as part of a project at the Center for Global Development on direct distribution. 
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policy may therefore be a component of a poverty reduction strategy. Moreover, Segal 
argues that such a universal scheme may even be more effective at reducing poverty than 
a targeted scheme because targeted benefits often fail to reach their intended recipients. 
 Second, a resource dividend is the easiest form of expenditure to make 
transparent: once the media and population know the total quantity of resource revenues, 
and the size of the population, they know how much each individual should receive. It 
makes it very easy for citizens to know whether they are receiving their due, and such 
transparency is likely to reduce ‘leakage’, or theft of revenues before they reach their 
intended recipients (Gauthier 2006). Third, removing revenues from government 
expenditure budgets eliminates some standard mechanisms of corruption such as over-
bidding for contracts. Finally, unlike the salaries paid to unproductive workers discussed 
above, or targeted benefits that are conditional on low income, a resource dividend is not 
distortionary in the economic sense: since it is unconditional, it does not give any 
incentive for inefficient or unproductive behaviour. 
 It has also been argued that direct distribution will reduce the risk of the resource 
curse, or the proposition that natural resource wealth has deleterious effects on a 
country’s economy, politics and institutions. Karl (1997) makes the argument that 
resource wealth leads to unaccountable and ineffective government institutions because 
the ease of collecting resource revenues implies that governments do not need to create 
the bureaucracies, administrative capacity and systems of conflict resolution that are 
required to collect taxes from the non-resource economy. In addition, the lack of taxation 
may help to sustain non-democratic and rent-seeking governments because untaxed 
citizens are less likely to demand government accountability (Ross 2004; Mehlum et al. 
2006; Prichard 2010).12 Regarding corruption, Gelb and Associates (1988: 17) write that 
‘a large rent component in national income, if not rapidly and widely dispersed across the 
population, is liable to divert scarce entrepreneurial talent away from commodity 
production into “rent-seeking” activities’. By delivering resource rents directly to 
citizens, forcing government to raise taxes in the usual way, direct distribution may 
reduce the risk of these outcomes. 
 
12Haber and Menaldo (2009), on the other hand, find that natural resource wealth is not associated with a 
lack of democracy. 
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It increases the risk, however, that the government may not be able to raise the tax 
revenues required to provide optimal levels of expenditure on infrastructure, public goods 
and public services. Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) find that developing countries that 
reduce trade tariffs are usually unable to fully compensate for the lost revenue through 
other taxes, suggesting that governments face constraints on how much tax they can raise. 
In this case, keeping resource revenues on the government budget removes a constraint 
with a high shadow price. 
 Direct distribution does not preclude smoothing: as with resource revenues more 
generally, a stabilization fund may be used to reduce the volatility of the dividend. As 
discussed below, the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend is a direct payment based on a 
five-year moving average of income accruing to the fund. Since the dividend depends on 
the income earned by the fund, rather than oil revenues, there is no correlation between 
the dividend and oil prices. Moreover, averaging over five years implies some smoothing 
even relative to the fund’s income. 
 I now consider three policies that are forms of direct distribution, in Bolivia, Iran 
and the US state of Alaska. 
3.2.3.1. Bolivia: Bonosol and Renta Dignidad 
Bolivia’s primary export is gas, and hydrocarbon revenues ranged between 26 and 42 per 
cent of total government revenues from 2004 to 2010, while the hydrocarbon sector has 
comprised between 5.0 and 6.5 per cent of GDP. The Renta Dignidad scheme is a 
universal pension funded by hydrocarbons, begun in 2008, which developed from the 
Bono Solidario, or Bonosol, created in the mid-1990s. Bonosol was created as part of the 
privatization (referred to as ‘capitalization’) of major national companies, including the 
national hydrocarbon company YPFB, and other reforms implemented by President 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada over the years 1993–7. It was intended as a mechanism for 
distributing the proceeds of the privatizations to the population, and was implemented at 
least partly to reduce political opposition. As Whitehead (1997: 15–16) puts it, ‘the 
capitalization formula was evidently designed with … political economy constraints in 
mind’. 
 Bonosol was a pension of 1,800 Bolivianos (currently about US$260) a year, paid 
to all citizens over the age of 65 who had already reached age 21 by the end of 1995. 
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Thus it was not conceptualized as a universal pension based on the inherent merits of 
such a benefit, but rather as compensation for the sale of a national asset. It was 
correspondingly aimed only at those Bolivians who were adults by the time of the 
privatizations, and would expire with those Bolivians. 
 Its actual lifetime was considerably shorter, however. It was initially paid in only 
one year, 1997, before Sánchez de Lozada’s successor, President Hugo Banzer, declared 
it unaffordable. On his return to the presidency Sánchez de Losada attempted to bring it 
back in 2003, but was unable to finance it as originally planned owing to continuing poor 
returns from the capital raised through the privatizations. Nonetheless, by getting money 
from alternative sources it continued to be paid through to 2007 (Müller 2009). 
 Bonosol was officially dropped in 2008 by the government of Evo Morales, to be 
replaced by the new Renta Dignidad. Renta is also a universal pension, but it differs from 
Bonosol in several key respects. First, unlike Bonosol it is conceptualized as a universal 
pension with no projected sunset period, and is explicitly linked to hydrocarbons rather 
than privatizations. It is financed by a fixed share (30 per cent) of the Impuesto Directo a 
los Hidrocarburos (IDH), or Direct Hydrocarbon Tax. It is described by the Bolivian 
Ministry of Autonomy (2008), in implicit contrast to (and criticism of) Bonosol, as 
follows: ‘It is the concrete result of the nationalization of our natural resources. These 
resources now go directly to the hands of those who most need them. It is a sustainable 
measure that does not represent the privatization of national companies nor the loss of our 
natural wealth and patrimony.’ 
 Second, it lowers the age at which Bolivians start to receive it from 65 to 60. 
Third, the payment remained the same for those who have some other source of pension 
in addition, but was raised by 25 per cent to Bs2,400 (about US$340 or PPP$86013) per 
year for those with no other pension. A further important practical difference is that 
Bonosol had to be collected from branch offices of the pension scheme, which entailed 
significant collection costs for many poor people living far from urban areas, while the 
Renta Dignidad is also distributed by fixed and mobile military units (Müller 2009: 168). 
 Renta Dignidad cost 1.4 per cent of GDP in 2008 and 1.5 per cent in 2009 (IMF 
2010: 6). Poverty was reported to have been reduced by 4.8 percentage points in 2008, 
 
13 Using the IMF’s World Economic Outlook estimated PPP exchange rate for 2010 of Bs2.8/PPP$. 
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but systematic analyses of the impact of the policy on poverty and inequality do not yet 
seem to be available. However, its magnitude is probably sufficient to eliminate poverty 
among the over-60s at the World Bank’s higher US$2-a-day international poverty line.14 
3.2.3.2. Iran: subsidies and direct distribution 
Iran is a major producer of oil. Oil revenues provided about 70 per cent of fiscal revenues 
over 2006–9 and 18–22 per cent of GDP (IMF 2010: 20). Fuel and other goods have been 
heavily subsidized, with the price of a litre of gasoline only about 10 US cents in recent 
years. However, in January 2010 the Parliament passed a bill to phase out these and other 
subsidies over five years, planning to replace them in part with universal cash transfers to 
the population (Tabatabai 2010). On 20 December 2010 the subsidies were cut, with 
petrol prices nearly quadrupling to 38 US cents per litre (Yong 2010). Households were 
given a one-off cash payment of about US$80 each to compensate and promised double 
that amount next year (Bozorgmehr 2010). 
 Under the government’s long-term proposal, transfers are supposed to total 
US$50 billion annually, or nearly US$60 per person per month. One motivation given for 
the proposed cash transfer is to make it politically easier to withdraw the subsidies: it is 
‘justified and perceived as a means of compensating the population for the removal of 
subsidies to which they have become accustomed. Many view cheap oil as a benefit to 
which they are entitled as a major oil producing nation, and the metamorphosis from 
price subsidies to cash transfers is seen as merely a change of form in that entitlement’ 
(Tabatabai 2010: 7). Whether the one-off cash payment will evolve into the planned long-
run system of transfers remains to be seen. 
3.2.3.3. Alaska: the Permanent Fund Dividend 
The US state of Alaska has a state-owned fund, called the Alaska Permanent Fund, that 
by law receives at least 25 per cent of the oil royalties received by the state government. 
Each year a dividend from this fund is given to all those have resided in the state for at 
least one calendar year. The dividend is calculated as 52.5 per cent of the Fund’s nominal 
income (not including the share of oil royalties that has been added to the Fund) averaged 
 
14 This poverty line is actually US$2.50 in 2005 PPP$. 
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over five years, divided by the number of eligible recipients.15 In most years it has lain 
between US$800 and US$2,000 (Figure 1). It is thus not really a direct distribution of oil 
revenues, but a cash payment financed by the return to an oil fund. 
 Since the state continues to pay royalties into the Fund, and will for as long as oil 
revenues flow, the dividend is a version of the BIH policy discussed above: it is based on 
revenues due to oil that has already been extracted, and gives no advance on the value of 
the oil that is yet to be produced. For this reason one would expect the Fund and the 
dividend to grow over time. The Fund has indeed been growing (Figure 2 on p. 24, where 
data are available only from 1995), but the dividend has been more volatile and the trend 
is less clear (Figure 1). 
It is difficult to identify the impact of this policy on the distribution of income, but 
the dividend may partly explain the fact that in 2007 Alaska had the joint second lowest 
poverty rate of all the states of the USA, despite having only the nineteenth highest per 
capita personal income (Segal 2011). 
Figure 1. Alaska Permanent Fund dividend, current US$ 
 
Source: http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/dividend/dividendamounts.cfm, accessed 20 October 2011. 
 
15 Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation website: see 
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/aboutFund/aboutPermFund.cfm and 
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/dividend/dividend.cfm, accessed 20 October 2011. 
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Figure 2. Alaska Permanent Fund, value in current US$bn 
 
Source: Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, Annual Report (various years), 
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/publications/reportArchive.cfm, accessed 20 October 2011. 
Note: Total liabilities and fund balances (reported as ‘Total liabilities, principal and earnings reserve’ for 
1995–2000). 
 
4. ECONOMIC MECHANISMS: THE ‘TRICKLE DOWN’ OF RESOURCE 
REVENUES AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
While the greatest impact of resource revenues on households works through fiscal 
policy, resource revenues have some impact on the economy almost independently of 
what they are spent on. In the mechanisms discussed here, the only assumption is that 
when income rises due to the resource, demand rises for both tradable and non-tradable 
goods. The mechanisms do not depend on who in particular receives the direct benefits of 
the resource. So they would be equally consistent with the standard case of revenues 
financing government expenditures, and with the extreme case of one private individual 
receiving and spending all of the revenues on himself – as long as he spends some of it on 
non-tradables such as the construction of mansions and domestic service. 
 It is the rise in demand for non-tradables that causes the best-known side effect of 
natural resource discoveries, namely Dutch Disease, or a rise in the real exchange rate 
caused by the increase in resource exports. This is usually lamented as causing a loss in 
competitiveness of non-resource exports, including manufacturing. However, what is 
rarely appreciated is the fact that manufacturing becomes uncompetitive only because the 
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returns to domestic factors of production, such as wages, have risen. That is, 
manufacturing becomes uncompetitive only if its costs rise, and its costs rise only if the 
labour and capital inputs have started to demand higher payments. So it occurs only if 
citizens have become richer. 
 The economic processes underlying these changes are examined in a trade-
theoretic context by Corden and Neary (1982) and using duality theory by Neary (1988). 
Corden and Neary identify two economic mechanisms whereby a resource discovery 
affects the rest of the economy in general equilibrium. The first is the ‘spending effect’, 
which refers to the effect of the rise in aggregate income and hence expenditure. Some of 
this income will be spent on tradables, whose prices, we assume, are fixed by 
international markets. But, as mentioned above, some will be spent on non-tradable 
goods and services. Since the resource discovery does not change the supply curve of 
non-tradables, the increase in demand for non-tradables implies that their price must rise 
relative to tradables. That is, the spending effect leads to a rise in the real exchange rate, 
defined as the cost of non-tradables relative to tradables or, equivalently, the average cost 
of domestic output relative to international prices. 
 This rise in the relative price of non-tradables is a core reason why output of 
manufacturing and other non-resource tradables is likely to decline: the price rise draws 
factors of production (labour and capital) out of these tradables and into the non-tradable 
sector. To illustrate, the rise in demand for non-tradables might imply a rise in demand 
for construction and transport. This will raise real wages paid in these sectors, and 
workers that were producing tradable manufactured goods will be attracted away from 
the factory and into construction or transport. The factory owner cannot afford the higher 
real wage to keep the workers because he has to compete with imported manufactured 
goods, so he produces less, and marginal producers will go out of business. This is bad 
for the factory owner, but good for the workers who have got higher-paid jobs elsewhere 
– and also good for business owners in the non-traded sectors. 
 The second mechanism, which we may call the ‘factor movement effect’,16 occurs 
only if the resource sector uses a significant share of domestic factors of production. If 
 
16 Corden and Neary call it the ‘resource movement effect’, where ‘resource’ means factor of production, 
but I choose the alternative term to avoid confusing this sense of ‘resource’ with the natural resource. 
26 
 
this is so, then it increases demand for those factors of production, again drawing them 
from the rest of the economy. Corden and Neary (1982) show that the precise effect on 
both the structure of output and on factor payments will depend on the structure of the 
economy, and generalizations are not possible. However, since resource sectors typically 
employ at most a very small share of domestic labour and capital, this second effect is 
likely to be small compared to the less ambiguous spending effect. 
 In sum, through the general equilibrium effects, the rise in national purchasing 
power due to natural resources would be expected to raise household incomes to some 
extent even if citizens do not benefit directly from resource revenues. 
 Karl (1997: 28) displays a very common misunderstanding of the economics of 
the Dutch Disease. She correctly observes that real exchange rate appreciation in oil 
exporters in the 1970s ‘cheapened imports and undermined local production’. But she 
then states that ‘in this way, the extensive reliance on imports, which was once aimed at 
plugging conjectural gaps between demand and supply in the aftermath of the boom, 
became a semipermanent and ultimately expensive feature of oil economies’. The idea 
that semi-permanent reliance on imports should be expensive, or otherwise regrettable, is 
a confusion: if one’s exports increase in value, then one’s imports have to increase in 
value similarly. Essentially, it has become more efficient for the country to produce more 
non-tradables and fewer non-resource tradables, and instead to import more tradables 
using oil revenues. 
 While there is nothing wrong in the short term with producing fewer 
manufactured goods if you can instead import more of them, it has often been argued that 
in the longer run deindustrialization leads to lower growth. The argument is that 
manufacturing encourages learning by doing, and promotes backward and forward 
linkages, while the resource sector and non-tradables do not (van Wijnbergen 1984; 
Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997). 
 This is a standard argument for the economic version of the ‘resource curse’, the 
proposition that having a large natural resource sector leads to lower economic growth 
(Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997; Sala-i-Martín and Subramanian 2003). This is 
independent of the institutional argument, discussed above, that resource wealth leads to 
unaccountable and ineffective government institutions. Other research, however, has 
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contested the finding that there is any association between resource wealth and economic 
growth (Ding and Field 2005; Stijns 2005; Brunnschweiler 2007; Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte 2008). 
 There is therefore no consensus on whether natural resources lower growth, but 
there is consensus that they raise the real exchange rate, and that this should raise average 
household incomes independently of whether they enjoy the direct benefits of resource 
revenue expenditures. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Natural resource revenues and their expenditure have to be considered in the light of 
fiscal policy more generally. But they deserve special treatment both because of their 
distinctive time profile, being both volatile and exhaustible, and because of their legal 
and political status. 
 There is a strong argument for smoothing out the volatility of resource revenues 
in order to avoid volatile government expenditures. Beyond this, how to spend these 
revenues depends on the circumstances of the country. Two sets of decisions have to be 
made: how to divide revenues between current consumption and investing for the future; 
and what to spend on, or invest in. Collier et al. (2009) and van der Ploeg and Venables 
(2010) argue that many developing countries are likely to do better investing in domestic 
capacity rather than in foreign financial markets, but in making such a judgement one has 
to consider political barriers to efficient investment, and possible capacity constraints. 
 I have also argued that current consumption, particularly through spending on 
policies that reduce poverty, may be optimal from the point of view of the intertemporal 
optimization of social welfare: once we drop the convenient fiction of a representative 
agent, the fact that many people are extremely poor implies that there can be no better 
way to spend resource revenues than on policies that alleviate poverty. The higher the 
expected rate of economic growth, the more likely expenditure on current poverty 
reduction is to maximize intertemporal social welfare, because future generations are 
expected to be richer in any case. 
 Citizens of resource-producing countries rightly feel that their natural resources 
belong to them, and that they have the right to benefit from them. But even those 
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revenues that flow without leakage from the resource to government expenditures can fail 
to benefit citizens to the extent that they should. Fuel subsidies are widespread and both 
highly inefficient and usually regressive. Swelling the ranks of public sector employees 
can also be an inefficient way to spend resource rents when there is no work for the 
employees to do. The most parsimonious form of rent distribution is through 
unconditional direct transfers, which are easy to make transparent and are non-
distortionary, avoiding the economic inefficiencies of the more common forms of 
expenditure. Moreover, despite their universality, they have the potential to be highly 
poverty reducing. Bolivia’s universal pension, funded by hydrocarbon revenues, is 
currently the closest to such a policy, and may be a useful benchmark for countries for 
which a fully universal transfer would seem too radical. 
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